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Chapter 4
Privacy in Crowdsourced Platforms
Thivya Kandappu, Arik Friedman, Vijay Sivaraman
and Roksana Boreli
4.1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing has emerged, in recent years, as a means of outsourcing various
tasks to groups of individuals that are recruited online. As defined in [23]:
Crowdsourcing is the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent
(usually an employee) and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people in
the form of an open call.
Crowdsourcing is increasingly used in a large number of application areas, from
user opinion surveys and other information collection (including, e.g., testing of
new designs) to contribution of content, for example, photos or other media, and
even funding of new ventures via crowdfunding. A list of crowdsourcing compa-
nies and their classification includes over 20 task categories and around 170
companies that provide crowdsourcing activities.1 These services have been used
widely—both academic and market researchers have been increasingly relying on
crowdsourcing platforms for conducting surveys, to gain new insights about cus-
tomers and populations.
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In this chapter, we focus on a narrower set of platforms that deal with collection
and aggregation of information, like the Amazon Mechanical Turk2
(AMT) platform that enables completion of human intelligence tasks or the Google
Consumer Surveys platform3 that enables large-scale market surveys.
In the vast majority of platforms, workers provide the information in a
quasi-anonymous way, as there is no direct relationship between the requester (the
company that requires completion of specific tasks) and the workers. Although the
majority of such platforms use a payment (or micropayment) system, all direct
interactions with the requesters are done thorough pseudonyms (worker IDs).
Nevertheless, the release of personal information and opinions, albeit in small
increments, can over time be accumulated (by the requesters or by the platform) to
identify and profile individuals. This gradual loss in privacy may be undesirable for
many workers, and even harmful (in social, financial, or legal ways) for some.
Furthermore, the threat comes not only from requesters, but also from the platform
itself, which can exploit the profiling for its own ends, or cede the information
gained about the workers to another entity for monetary gain.
In this chapter we concentrate on the privacy issues of workers in crowdsourcing
platforms. After a short overview of crowdsourcing platforms in Sect. 4.2, we start
in Sect. 4.3 with a brief review of privacy risks in online systems. We then discuss
how these risks apply to crowdsourcing platforms, focusing on the potential for
personally identifying information (PII) exposure. These risks are illustrated
through an example of a real world attack, conducted through a series of survey
tasks in AMT. Following this, we present in Sect. 4.4 an overview of solutions that
enhance privacy in online services in general, and which could also be applicable to
crowdsourcing platforms.
In Sect. 4.5 we focus on a specific proposal for a privacy-preserving crowd-
sourcing platform [27] that relies on obfuscation, and describe the design choices
surrounding obfuscation techniques, worker privacy levels, privacy loss quantifi-
cation, worker privacy depletion, cost settings, and worker utility estimation. We
also present the implementation details for a prototype of the system. We sum-
marize in Sect. 4.6 the challenges that still need to be addressed to enhance worker
privacy in crowdsourcing platforms and conclude the chapter in Sect. 4.7.
4.2 Crowdsourcing Platforms
Crowdsourcing platforms are leveraged to obtain feedback on goods and services,
and to collect content or ideas, by soliciting contributions from an online com-
munity, rather than from more traditional sources like company employees or
suppliers. A classification of crowdsourcing was presented in [47], distinguishing
2https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome.
3http://www.google.com/insights/consumersurveys/home.
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between integrative crowdsourcing, where clients seeks to build databases or
information bases (like data collection or translation of simple texts) and selective
crowdsourcing, where a problem may be solved by relying on competencies of the
crowd-based contributors.
Platforms like AMT, Crowdflower,4 and oDesk5 are used to crowdsource from
online workers tasks like deciphering images, ranking websites, and answering
surveys. AMT, launched in 2005, is extensively used by researchers in experi-
mental psychology to conduct low-cost large-scale behavioral studies by obtaining
opinion survey data from paid volunteer populations. Today AMT engages over
500,000 workers from 190 countries.6 The Google Consumer Surveys platform
utilizes a “surveywall” approach, where access to premium content is gated and
enabled for users upon completion of survey questions. The Consumer Surveys
platform customers include over 130 publishers (online newspapers and magazines)
only in the US based market.7 Crowdsourcing has also gained popularity in the
research community. As of March 2014, Google Scholar counts more than 10,000
academic publications that involve crowdsourced experiments via AMT.
Given that mobile devices have become an integral part of people’s daily lives,
mobile crowdsourcing has also gained high popularity, especially in the area of
environmental monitoring. For example, mCrowd [56] is an iPhone-based mobile
crowdsourcing platform that enables mobile workers to contribute to
geolocation-aware image collection, road traffic monitoring, and so on, which
exploit the sensors available on iPhones. Txteagle [14] is a mobile crowdsourcing
marketplace used in Kenya and Rwanda for translations, polls, and transcriptions.
Waze8 is a mapping app that relies on users’ contributions to provide real-time
traffic information. It has 15 million active users who upload their live driving data
by default, so others can benefit by seeing the speed at which the contributors are
moving. OpenSignal9 allows its users to map cellular coverage, find Wi-Fi hotspots,
test and improve their mobile reception, and obtain faster data rates. OpenSignal
has been downloaded 3.7 million times and has about 700,000 active users (at the
time of writing).
A crowdsourcing system typically comprises the following actors: workers
(users, or contributors), who are the individuals forming the crowd that provides the
data, or accomplishes selected tasks; requesters, who are the companies or indi-
viduals that need a set of tasks to be completed; and the crowdsourcing platform,
which manages the crowdsourcing process, including matching workers to
requesters and handling worker compensation.
4https://crowdflower.com/.
5https://www.odesk.com/.
6https://www.requester.mturk.com/tour, accessed March 27, 2014.
7http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevecooper/2013/03/29/qa-with-paul-mcdonald-co-creator-of-
google-consumer-surveys/.
8https://www.waze.com/.
9http://opensignal.com/.
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4.3 Privacy Issues in Online Services
In recent years, a number of real-world attacks have shown the importance of taking
privacy into consideration when contributing data in online services. In this section,
we discuss the main risks to worker privacy in online services and then focus on
specific risks in crowdsourcing services, with a detailed description of an example
attack.
We note that privacy issues may exist not only for the workers, but also for the
requesters. For example, a company that requires a set of tasks to be accomplished
by the crowd, may wish to keep such tasks, or the content of the data it shares,
private. This problem can be encountered, for example, in services related to image
classification and text translation [53]. However, as the vast majority of studies and
real-world breach examples address worker privacy, in this chapter we conse-
quently focus on worker privacy issues.
4.3.1 Risks of Re-Identification
Privacy risks related to public release of anonymized data sets have been demon-
strated by a number of real-world events. As a prominent example, in 2006, AOL10
released a 2 GB file containing 21 million web search queries from 650,000 users,
conducted over a period of three months [4]. The consequences of the data release
were devastating from the privacy perspective. AOL took down the data within
days of publication due to public outcry, but the data has already been downloaded,
reposted,11 and made searchable by a number of sites. In a matter of days, the
identity of user 4417749 had been unmasked by New York Times reporters [1].
Besides harm to the users whose names and social security numbers were pub-
lished,12 the AOL search log release may have had other harmful consequences the
extent of which is difficult to assess, such as: loss of user trust in AOL, as well as,
possibly, in other search engines; increased anxiety regarding the privacy of online
activities for users; and hesitation of other companies to share their data to enable
broader innovation [21]. Following the release of this private data set, the CTO of
AOL resigned, two employees were dismissed [24], and a class action lawsuit was
filed.
Similarly, in 2006, DVD rental company Netflix announced a contest with a $1
million prize for the best movie recommendation algorithm, and made an anony-
mized dataset of user ratings available to all interested participants [5]. The Netflix
prize data release included over 100 million ratings given by over 480,000 users to
17,700 movies. Despite the anonymization of the dataset, Narayanan and
10http://www.aol.com/.
11See, for example, http://www.gregsadetsky.com/aol-data/.
12http://superjiju.wordpress.com/2009/01/18/aol-search-query-database/.
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Shmatikov [39] have shown how to de-anonymize several users in the published
dataset by cross-correlating anonymized Netflix ratings with non-anonymous movie
ratings on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) website. While the ratings of
movies users made on IMDb did not pose privacy risks, as they were made public
deliberately by the users, the re-identification of these users in the Netflix dataset
exposed also their private ratings on Netflix. The study demonstrated how little
auxiliary information is needed for reliable cross-correlation: for example, with
eight known movie ratings, 99 % of the records could be uniquely identified; two
ratings and their dates are sufficient for re-identification of 68 % of the records.
Overall, prior research, including [39], has shown analytically that even a rel-
atively small amount of background information about an individual can facilitate a
fairly reliable de-identification of that individual, in a seemingly well-anonymized
dataset.
4.3.2 Risks of Profiling and Data Misuse
The growing amount of information collected about individuals is increasingly
utilized for profiling and subsequent targeting of users. For example, the popular
loyalty and rewards cards enable retailers to collect details of users’ consumption
patterns, track their shopping habits, and mine the data to determine users’ interests
and needs. Australian retailer Woolworths recently stated in an industry publication
that it has managed to “overlay” its insurance company’s car crash database and its
Everyday Rewards statistics, to reveal which consumers were best to target for
insurance purchases [54]. Woolworths also shares its anonymous data with
Quantium, a company that sells this data to its clients for direct marketing [54].
As a specific example of customer data use, it was shown in [22] how Target can
successfully predict whether a female customer is expecting a child. Target assigns
every customer a Guest ID number, tied to her credit card, name, or email address,
and becomes a depository for her history of purchases and any demographic
information collected from her, or bought from other sources. Using this data,
Target assigns a score to every female customer to indicate the likelihood that she
may be pregnant. More importantly, it can also estimate the due date, so that
coupons can be timed to very specific stages of a customer’s pregnancy.
In a second example, the US based political media firm, Engage,13 is able to
predict who users will vote for, how likely users are to go to the polls, and the
potential for them to change their vote. They have reported, during the previous US
elections, that if users use Spotify to listen to music, Tumblr to consume content, or
Buzzfeed to keep up on the latest in social media, there is a high likelihood that they
will vote for President Obama. On the other hand, if they buy things on eBay, play
13http://enga.ge/.
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FarmVille, or search the Web with Bing, they are more likely to favor Mitt
Romney.
Finally, a team of British researchers have developed an algorithm that uses
tracking data from people’s phones to predict where they will be in 24 h [40], with
an average error of just 20 meters. The researchers combined tracking data from
individual participants’ phones with similar data from their friends, that is, other
people in their contact list.
While these examples represent a small fraction of the ways in which companies
are using data to predict user behavior, the proliferation of personal data is likely to
drive a rapid increase in the business of prediction. As more of user movements,
browsing patterns, purchase history, and social media interactions become recor-
ded, more companies will find ways to use this data to profile users and exploit this
knowledge for profit. These capabilities incentivize a multi-billion dollar industry of
data brokers to collect and sell personal user data, with little or no transparency, and
often without the knowledge and consent of the individuals to whom the data
pertains [43].
4.3.3 Privacy Issues in Crowdsourcing Platforms
The examples outlined in the previous sections relate to online services in general.
In this section, we consider specific risks in crowdsourcing platforms and provide
an example of how a requester can attain knowledge about the personal details of
workers in an anonymous crowdsourcing system.
4.3.3.1 The Lack of Worker Anonymity Guarantees
In a technical report, Lease et al. [32] have identified a direct loss of worker
anonymity on AMT. In AMT, requesters and workers are identified with a
14-character alphanumeric string. However, Lease et al. have observed that the
same string that identifies a worker in AMT is also the unique identifier of that
account across all Amazon services. Therefore, any public information associated
with an Amazon account, such as name and picture on the public Amazon profile,
product reviews and ratings, or a wish list, will be easily accessible via that
account’s Web URL.14 The use of the same account to access both AMT and other
Amazon services allows workers to use the proceeds for their AMT work towards
purchases on Amazon’s website. Moreover, Lease et al. pointed out that the term
“anonymous” has never been used on AMT’s website and policies, and while these
policies express Amazon’s concern for workers’ privacy, they do not state explicit
guarantees of worker anonymity. However, it is unclear whether workers are aware
14www.amazon.com/gp/pdp/profile/<WorkerID>.
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of the tight connection between their alphanumeric identifier on AMT and their
public information on other Amazon services. In fact, a thread on Turker Nation (a
forum dedicated to AMT discussions), predating Lease et al.’s work, reflects the
surprise of workers who learned about this relation.15
4.3.3.2 De-Anonymization and Privacy Loss via Inference Attacks
Lease et al. [32] suggested that having worker IDs that are not linked to other
(Amazon) services may mitigate the current direct anonymity loss issue for
workers. However, such measures may not be sufficient to eliminate all threats to
worker anonymity and privacy. Kandappu et al. [26] have shown how privacy risks
like those explored in Sect. 4.3.1, could easily apply to existing crowdsourcing
platforms to de-anonymize workers and obtain sensitive private information, in a
short time period and at very low cost, by correlating responses across multiple
surveys.
The inference attack in [26] comprised of launching a series of survey tasks in
AMT (through the third-party aggregator CrowdFlower16). The first survey queried
workers for their opinions on astrology services, and in the process obtained their
star-sign and day/month of birth. The second survey purportedly conducted market
research of online match-making services, and thereby obtained the workers’
gender and year of birth. With the third survey, on mobile phone coverage, the
researchers obtained workers’ zip code information.
The surveys were designed with sufficient redundancy to help identify and filter
out workers who gave random responses. Further, these surveys were posted
independently over several days, and workers were unlikely to have known that
they were conducted by the same entity. The researchers used the unique IDs
(constant across all surveys) to link workers who took all the three surveys above
and to obtain a combination of their personal details, that is, their date of birth,
gender, and zip code. We note that previous studies [20, 51] have shown the
effectiveness of using these attributes in re-identification of individuals.
A fourth survey was then launched, asking workers about their smoking habits
and coughing frequency. Overall, of the 400 unique workers who took the surveys,
72 could be linked from the first three surveys, and the respiratory health (and
likelihood of tuberculosis) for 18 of these individuals could be inferred from the
fourth survey using their unique ID, resulting in a potentially serious breach of
privacy. This experiment took only a few days and cost less than $30; one can only
imagine what the scale of privacy loss could be, were this experiment to be con-
ducted by entities with larger resources.
Finally, the above experiment was followed up with another survey, where
workers were asked if they would participate in a survey, if they knew they could be
15http://turkernation.com/archive/index.php/t-6065.html.
16https://crowdflower.com/.
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de-anonymized and profiled. Out of 100 workers who took this survey, 73
(including 15 of the 18 workers above, whose respiratory health could potentially
be made public) responded that they were not aware that they could be profiled, and
indicated that they would not have participated otherwise. These experiments
illustrate that workers can be profiled easily and at low cost, despite their disap-
proval of such practices.
The release of personal facts and opinions, albeit in small increments, can over
time be accumulated (by the requesters or by the platform) to profile individuals
(e.g., the work carried out in [30] shows that a wide variety of people’s attributes
can be accurately inferred using their Facebook likes). This gradual loss of privacy
may be undesirable for workers, and even harmful (in social, financial, or legal
ways) for some. Furthermore, the threat comes not only from requesters, but also
from the platform itself, which can exploit the profiling for its own ends, or cede it
to another entity for gain.
We note that AMT’s policies17 explicitly forbid using the platform to collect
personally identifiable information, or requiring workers to disclose their identity,
directly or indirectly. However, partial information (e.g., gender or age), which is
not sufficient for identifying an individual on its own, may be legitimately acquired
for the purpose of a specific survey. Despite the policy restrictions, it may be
difficult to track and enforce limitations on subsequent combining and (mis)use of
this information.
4.4 Overview of Existing Solutions
We now present an overview of recent technological advances in defining and
protecting individuals’ privacy and data confidentiality (visibility of the data values
used for aggregation) in data publishing and aggregation. We note that in crowd-
sourcing, as in most services that rely on users’ data, there is a need to balance the
privacy of individual participants with the greater good for which the aggregate data
can be used.
4.4.1 Anonymization
Early research works on data anonymization proposed sanitizing user data by
masking or removing PII such as name and address, and quasi-identifiers such as
gender and zip code. k-anonymity [46, 52] takes a “blend into the crowd” approach
to privacy, and requires that every combination of quasi-identifiers appears in at
least k data instances. This is achieved by generalization of such identifiers, for
17https://www.mturk.com/mturk/help?helpPage=policies, accessed March 27, 2014.
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example, by limiting the zip code to four or fewer, rather than five, recorded digits.
Further refinements of k-anonymity include l-diversity [37], t-closeness [33], and
other variants, which introduce additional restrictions on the released data values. It
was demonstrated, however, that such intuitive anonymization techniques are not
effective in protecting user privacy, as individual users can be re-identified via the
use of background information [10, 39, 44, 51], as shown by the AOL and Netflix
data release examples from Sect. 4.3.1. To date, safe release of anonymized data for
analysis purposes is still an open research problem. In addition, using such tech-
niques in crowdsourcing scenarios may not be practical, as users need to be
identifiable so that they can be compensated for contributing their data.
4.4.2 Data Obfuscation
Data obfuscation techniques protect user privacy by perturbing the data contributed
by individuals.
4.4.2.1 Randomized Response
A traditional method to obfuscate data is by randomization—this can be done by
adding noise sampled from a selected distribution, by multiplying with noise or by
projecting the data, to alter the individual values of the records. This method relies
on the ability to recover the probability distribution of the aggregate (non-noisy)
data, which can subsequently be used for data analysis. The earliest work on
randomization was presented in [34, 55], where it was used to eliminate the
untruthful answer bias. A generic approach proposed in [2, 3] is to add random
distortion values drawn independently from a known distribution, for example, the
uniform distribution. A number of improvements to this technique were subse-
quently proposed [15, 16].
We note that randomization methods apply noise to the records in a data-
independent way, thereby this technique can be utilized at the source of data
collection. Thus, perturbation of the records does not require a trusted server.
However, it was shown that an adversary may analyze the data and filter out some
of the noise, effectively reducing the bounds of uncertainty introduced by the noise
and compromising the privacy guarantees [29].
4.4.2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [13] is a privacy model based on the principle that the output of
a computation should not allow inference about any record in the input, irrespective
of an adversary’s computational power or the available background knowledge.
This guarantee is obtained by constraining the effect that any single record could
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have on the outcome of the computation. Consequently, the promise of differential
privacy is that the probability of a “bad” outcome resulting from a computation on
the data will be almost unaffected by the specific value of any particular record in
the dataset. Yet in aggregate, these records would still provide useful information.
Formally, a mechanism K provides e; dð Þ-differential privacy [12] (or simply e-
differential privacy for d ¼ 0) if for any two datasets A and B differing in a single
record, and for all outcomes S:
Pr½KðAÞ 2 S  expðeÞ  Pr½KðBÞ 2 S þ d: ð4:1Þ
The parameter e controls the level of privacy, where smaller values of e provide
stricter bounds on the influence of any particular input record on the outcome, and
therefore provide better privacy—adding or removing any particular record would
hardly change the probability of obtaining a given outcome, so the outcome would
not reveal much about any underlying record. The parameter d allows the condition
in Eq. (4.1) to be relaxed for unlikely events, allowing e-differential privacy to be
breached in some rare cases. One of the prevalent methods to achieve differential
privacy is by adding noise to the outcome of a computation. The noise is calibrated
according to the influence that any record may have on this outcome such that
Eq. 4.1 holds, as further described in Sect. 4.5.2.2. Differential privacy maintains
composability, that is, if two computations maintain ðe1; d1Þ and ðe2; d2Þ differential
privacy respectively, then executing both would amount to ðe1 þ e2; d1 þ d2Þ dif-
ferential privacy.
The practical implications of differentially private analysis were studied in many
application domains, including network trace analysis [38], intelligent transporta-
tion systems [28], collaborative security mechanisms [42], and distributed stream
monitoring [17]. Most applicable to the crowdsourcing scenarios are the distributed
differential privacy mechanisms [12, 41], that provide strong privacy guarantees in
distributed settings. Rastogi and Nath in [41] designed a two-round protocol based
on the threshold homomorphic cryptosystem, and Shi et al. in [48] applied cryp-
tographic techniques to allow an untrusted aggregator to compute sums without
learning anything about the user inputs. Both designs presented in [41, 48] achieve
distributed differential privacy while reducing the computational load per user.
These systems leverage cryptographic techniques to generate differentially private
noise in a distributed manner, but unfortunately do not scale well. In Sect. 4.5 we
describe in greater detail a system that relies on differential privacy to track privacy
loss in a crowdsourcing scenario.
4.4.3 Cryptographic Mechanisms
Cryptographic mechanisms are commonly used in conjunction with obfuscation to
achieve both data confidentiality and privacy [41, 48]. Chen et al. [8] proposed a
system that performs statistical queries over private client data (distributed on local
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databases, e.g., on client devices), where the analyst communicates with clients via
an honest-but-curious proxy. On first connection, a proxy assigns a unique ID to a
client. Answers are provided as binary values corresponding to a set of buckets, that
is, the potential values that a query may result in. Each binary value is encrypted
using the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) cryptosystem [19], a probabilistic public-key
cryptosystem that ensures each encrypted value is represented by a different
cyphertext. The analyst combines the decrypted client answers (that are also
obfuscated using a differentially private mechanism) to produce the result. The
authors extended these concepts in [7] to propose the SplitX system. This again
includes an analyst, a set of clients who locally store their data and a set of
intermediate entities: an aggregator and two mixes. However, SplitX uses a simple
XOR-based crypto-mechanism and a series of split messages (each message is split
into two, which are sent in parallel to any of the two intermediate nodes). This
provides the additional properties of anonymity and unlinkability and enables
considerably improved system performance.
A different approach to enabling confidentiality is to apply a secret sharing
cryptographic mechanism to the distributed private data, and perform Secure
Multi-Party Computation (MPC). However, this approach is only resilient to a
specific proportion of honest-but-curious attackers who collude to learn the private
data and/or the result of aggregation. MPC has been applied to crowdsourcing
platforms using the Sharemind implementation, as described in [6].
4.4.4 Compensating Users for Privacy Loss
Rather than limiting privacy loss when collecting and using personal information,
an alternative approach is to accept this loss and compensate the users accordingly,
so that they are incentivized to share information. Laudon [31] proposed a market
for personal data, which relies on individual ownership of this information. In fact,
several start-ups, such as Reputation.com [50], Handshake [36], and Datacoup [49],
are endeavoring to make such markets a reality.
Further to this, Ghosh and Roth [18] initiated a study of markets for private data,
where the privacy of users, as measured by differential privacy, is the sold com-
modity. Specifically, they consider a setting where the data is binary, and the
aggregator wishes to estimate the sum of bits. They proposed the FairQuery
mechanism, which achieves the optimal accuracy given a budget B, among the set
of all truthful, individually rational envy-free fixed purchase mechanisms. Dandekar
et al. [11] generalized these results to linear predictors (with inputs in Rn), and
observed that while these settings are similar to the knapsack auction mechanism,
they also pose the challenge that privacy costs exhibit externalities. That is, the
privacy cost of an individual depends also on which other individuals are being
compensated.
One of the challenges highlighted by Gosh and Roth [18] is that the data col-
lector will only get the information of individuals who value their privacy at a lower
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cost than that offered by the buyer. This introduces a selection bias, which could
lead to inaccurate results. Another challenge is that an individual’s cost for privacy
may be correlated to private information, and therefore might be itself private
information. In fact, they showed that, in general, it is not possible for any indi-
vidually rational direct revelation mechanism to compensate individuals for their
privacy loss due to unknown correlations between their cost functions and their
private data. Ligett and Roth [35] proposed to circumvent this impossibility result
by considering a “take-it-or-leave-it” framework, where a surveyor randomly
samples members of the underlying population, and offers them the same price in
return for participating in the survey. These offers are repeated with fresh popu-
lation samples and with increasing prices, until a sufficient rate of participation is
obtained. This model captures that individuals may also experience a cost when
information about their cost function (i.e., the cost they associate with privacy loss)
is revealed. The model also captures that individuals can suffer negative utility even
when they choose not to participate in surveys, as this choice may be correlated
with their private information.
All the aforementioned works [11, 18, 35] assumed that users cannot lie about
their private information, but can lie about their costs. The truthful mechanisms
ensure that individuals do not mis-report their cost functions in an attempt to
maximize their payment. In contrast, Chen et al. [9] did not assume that players
provide truthful answers. Instead, they considered settings where users may choose
to lie, but also have a direct interest in the outcome of the mechanisms. They
explicitly modeled privacy in the participants’ utility functions, and designed
truthful mechanisms with respect to it. The mechanisms leverage the users’ interest
in the outcome, such that the payoff overcomes the users’ value for privacy.
Essentially, the privacy parameter should only be set to be small enough such that
the privacy costs are outweighted by the participants’ preferences for outcomes.
Finally, Riederer et al. [45] introduced a mechanism of transactional privacy,
which enables end-users to sell or lease portions of their personal information (on a
strictly opt-in basis) in exchange for monetary compensation. This compensation is
determined in an auction, where data aggregators place bids based on their valu-
ation of the user’s information. The users can then decide what and how much
information will be disclosed to the aggregators, and the data can be sold multiple
times.
4.5 Loki: Privacy Preserving Crowdsourcing Platform
In Sect. 4.4 we surveyed general techniques for protecting user privacy in data
analysis, which are also applicable to crowdsourcing platforms. In this section we
consider in depth “Loki,” a system proposed by Kandappu et al. [26, 27], which
focuses on facilitating the crowdsourcing applications in a privacy preserving way.
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4.5.1 Architecture and Entities
The proposed system (Fig. 4.1) comprises three entities: requesters, workers, and
the broker platform.
Requesters acquire data from workers using a set of questions in a survey form
(the work largely focuses on ratings-based questions and multiple-choice questions).
The requester pays the broker to run the survey, specifying an upper bound on total
cost. The requester aims for high accuracy (utility) in the aggregated response for
any survey, so that it closely represents the feedback of the entire population.
Workers respond to questions in the surveys, using a supplied application
(app) installed on their personal device (smart phone/tablet). The app allows
workers to obfuscate their responses at source. The workers’ monetary compen-
sation may in general depend on their choice of privacy level—higher privacy
levels entail higher obfuscation and hence lower payment. Loki does not deal with
intentional lying (or cheating) by workers to get higher compensation; however,
lying may make the worker a worse predictor of the population average, reducing
the chances that the algorithm (described in Sect. 4.5.3.4) will select this worker for
subsequent surveys, thereby offsetting the monetary gains from cheating.
The broker provides a platform for launching surveys. It receives payment from
requesters, and passes it on to workers (less a commission). The broker has a dual
Fig. 4.1 Loki: System components and the basic protocol
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objective: to provide accurate population estimates to requesters, and to extend the
lifetime of workers in the system. The broker keeps track of workers’ performance
(i.e., how good a predictor of population behavior each worker has been in the past)
and privacy (cumulative depletion of a privacy “budget” due to participation in
surveys), so it can balance the trade-off within the cost budget.
4.5.2 Design Choices
4.5.2.1 Obfuscation and Worker Privacy Levels
In Loki, the worker client locally obfuscates the answer before reporting it to the
broker. For ratings-based questions, Gaussian noise Nð0; c2Þ is locally added to the
worker response. Gaussian distribution was chosen over uniform as it has
unbounded range, and hence does not compromise worker privacy in boundary
cases. It was preferred over Laplace noise since it is additive, that is, the sum of
Gaussian noise terms is still Gaussian. Further, note that the mean of the noise is
chosen to be zero for convenience, so as not to introduce any bias one way or the
other. The standard deviation c is adjusted based on the worker’s privacy chosen
privacy level. For multiple-choice questions, Loki relies on the randomized
response technique [55], whereby the worker’s true selection is preserved with
probability 1 p, and with probability p p\0:5ð Þ the response is changed uni-
formly randomly to one of the other choices. Again, the value of p is dictated by the
worker’s chosen privacy level, described next.
For the sake of simplicity, Loki uses a set of four privacy levels: none, low,
medium, and high. The chosen privacy level determines the amplitude of the noise
that is added to obfuscate the true worker response. The higher the privacy level, the
larger the obfuscation parameter (c or p above).
Example 1 Consider a 5-point Likert scale commonly used in psychology studies,
with the possible response values including: 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3
(neutral), 4 (agree), and 5 (strongly agree). A reasonable selection of obfuscation
parameter might be: c ¼ 0 for no privacy, c ¼ 3 for low privacy, c ¼ 6 for medium
privacy, and c ¼ 12 for high privacy (note that the reported responses will con-
sequently be real-valued rather than integers). For a multiple choice question with
five options, a reasonable selection of obfuscation parameter might be: p ¼ 0 for no
privacy, p ¼ 0:1 for low privacy, p ¼ 0:3 for medium privacy, and p ¼ 0:4 for high
privacy.
In general, the worker can set the desired level of privacy for each conducted
survey. For simplicity, we assume that the worker’s choice is consistent across
surveys (i.e., the worker tends to choose the same level of privacy for each survey),
but our selection algorithm (described in Sect. 4.5.3) can be easily modified to adapt
based on different user choices.
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4.5.2.2 Quantification and Tracking of Privacy Loss
Loki quantifies the privacy loss for a worker who answers a particular survey at a
particular privacy level, so it can be accumulated and tracked across multiple
surveys. For this purpose, Loki relies on differential privacy, where the differential
privacy constraint is applied to each survey answer. That is, the parameters e and d
capture how easy or difficult it is to infer the original user response given the noisy
survey response. For rating-based questions, the privacy guarantees of Gaussian
noise Nð0; c2Þ can be mapped to e; dð Þ-differential privacy measures through the
relation [12]:
ec2
2R2
þ lnðec2Þ ln 1
d
; ð4:2Þ
where R is the range of the user’s possible answers. To illustrate by an example:
Example 2 Following from the previous example, the 5-point Likert scale based
ratings with privacy levels {no, low, medium, high} respectively used
c ¼ f0; 3; 6; 12g. Since R ¼ 4, and fixing d ¼ 0:01, the privacy settings correspond
to differential privacy guarantees of e ¼ f1; 3:42; 0:85; 0:21g respectively.
For multiple choice questions (with n options) obfuscated using the randomized
response technique, the mapping from the probability measure p to e; dð Þ can be
derived from (4.1) as:
e lnð1 p dÞ  lnðpÞ þ lnðn 1Þ: ð4:3Þ
Example 3 Following from the previous example of a multiple choice question
with five options, the privacy settings {no, low, medium, high} respectively used
p ¼ f0; 0:1; 0:3; 0:4g. Fixing d ¼ 0:01, the privacy settings correspond to differ-
ential privacy guarantees of e ¼ f1; 3:57; 2:22; 1:77g respectively.
The differential privacy metrics are composable (i.e., additive), and the worker’s
privacy loss over successive surveys can therefore easily be upper bounded by
accumulating these metrics over the worker’s lifetime. These upper bounds capture
the relative privacy loss for each of the workers, which the broker can rely on to
ensure a fair distribution of the privacy loss across workers. In the rest of this
chapter, we will fix the value of d at 0:01, and use e for comparing privacy loss
across workers. Further, for cases where workers choose privacy level “none,” e is
set to 0 (rather than the theoretically correct value of 1), since the workers are
explicitly indicating that they do not value privacy for that survey, and the effect of
this survey on their cumulative privacy loss should not be accounted for.
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4.5.2.3 Cost Settings
A worker i, who contributes data in response to a survey questionnaire, receives a
compensation ci. Workers who choose a higher privacy level (and consequently add
more noise to their responses) may receive lower compensation than those who
choose a lower level of privacy.
Example 4 Following from the previous example that uses a 5-point Likert scale,
the privacy levels none, low, medium, and high could correspond to worker pay-
ments ci of $0.8, $0.4, $0.2, and $0.1 respectively. The unit of cost is arbitrary and
can be scaled appropriate to the complexity or value of the survey.
4.5.2.4 Worker History and Utility
Despite noise addition by workers to obfuscate individual answers, some charac-
teristics of worker behavior can be discerned by the broker over time. As an
example, noise added by a worker to n successive ratings-based questions, each
with iid noise Nð0; c2Þ, can be averaged by the broker to estimate the worker’s
mean noise Nð0; c2=nÞ that has lower variance. This fact can be leveraged by the
broker to estimate metrics such as the “error” of the worker’s ratings, that is, to
determine on average how close the worker’s ratings in the past have been to the
population averages. This in turn indicates how representative this worker is of the
general population, and helps the broker estimate the “value” of the worker towards
obtaining an accurate population estimate. In Sect. 4.5.3, this notion of worker
“value” is leveraged to select workers for each survey, in a balanced way.
4.5.3 Privacy-Preserving User Selection Mechanism
This section describes a practical method for the broker to select workers to participate
in each survey so as to balance cost, accuracy, and privacy. We outline the approach
for ratings-based questions (continuous-valued); the analysis for multiple-choice
questions (discrete-valued) is presented in the authors’ full version [25].
4.5.3.1 Quantifying Estimation Error
The broker is tasked with estimating the population average of a statistic (e.g., movie
rating, product popularity, disease prevalence). Due to the cost constraint set by the
requester, the broker can query only a subset of workers S from the universal set of
workers U, and this selection is based on accuracy, cost, and privacy depletion.
Denote by xi 2 R the input of worker i 2 U. The desired population average h is
given by h ¼ P
U
xi=jUj. The broker estimates this statistic by sampling a subset of
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workers S. Further, each worker i sends obfuscated input x̂i ¼ xi þ ni to the broker,
whereby the true input xi is combined with noise ni taken from Nð0; c2i Þ, where ci
depends on the worker’s chosen privacy level. The broker’s estimate ĥ of the
population average is then given by
ĥ ¼
X
S
x̂i=jSj ¼
X
S
ðxi þ niÞ=jSj: ð4:4Þ
The mean squared error in the estimator is given by:
RMSE2 ¼ ðĥ hÞ2 ¼
P
S
ni
jSj þ
P
S
xi
jSj  h
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5
2
: ð4:5Þ
When selecting S, the broker therefore accounts for two influencing factors: the
level of privacy required by each worker, which determines the error due to
privacy-related noise (first term above), and the expected sampling error (second
term above).
The “value” of a worker depends on how accurately the worker’s responses
reflect those of the population at large. To quantify this, consider the worker error,
i.e., the difference Di between the worker’s response and the true population
average, given by Di ¼ xi  h. Treating the worker error Di as a random variable,
we can estimate its mean li and variance r
2
i from the history of prior responses
Hi ¼ fx̂ijg of the worker using:
li ¼ E½Di ¼
X
j:xij2Hi
ðxij  hjÞ=jHij; ð4:6Þ
r2i ¼ Var½Di ¼
X
j:xij2Hi
ðxij  hj  liÞ2=jHij; ð4:7Þ
where hj denotes the true population average in a past survey question qj. New
workers can be assigned a default value of worker error.
Similarly, we can define the value of a group of workers S. The average rating by
the group is defined as xS ¼
P
S xi=jSj. Denoting by DS the group error, which
quantifies the difference between this group’s average rating and the population
average, we have DS ¼ xS  h. The mean and variance of the group error can be
deduced from the prior history HS ¼ fx̂Sjg of this group using:
lS ¼ E½DS ¼
X
j:xSj2HS
ðxSj  hjÞ=jHSj; ð4:8Þ
r2S ¼ Var½DS ¼
X
j:xSj2HS
ðxSj  hj  lSÞ2=jHSj: ð4:9Þ
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The estimation of the worker and group errors above assumes perfect knowledge
of the true worker responses xi and the population averages hj. In reality the broker
only has the noisy worker/group responses (x̂i or x̂S), as well as noisy population
estimate ĥj for prior survey questions. The mean lSð Þ and variance r2S
 
of the true
group error can be approximated with the mean l̂Sð Þ and variance r̂2S
 
of the
computed errors, using the fact that the noise is independent of worker responses
and has zero mean:
l̂S  lS; ð4:10Þ
r̂2S  r2S þ
P
S
c2i
jSj2 þ
P
U
c2i
jUj2 : ð4:11Þ
The expectation of the error in Eq. (4.5) is then derived as:
EðRMSE2Þ ¼E
P
S
ni
jSj
0
@
1
A
2
2
64
3
75þ E xS  hð Þ2h i ¼
¼
P
S
c2i
jSj2 þ r
2
S þ l2S  l̂2S þ r̂2S 
P
U
c2i
jUj2 :
ð4:12Þ
4.5.3.2 Balancing Cost and Accuracy in a Single Survey
As described in Sect. 4.5.2.3, each worker chooses a privacy setting, which incurs a
privacy cost ðei; diÞ. The privacy protection is obtained by adding noise with var-
iance c2i . The privacy setting is also associated with monetary compensation ci.
Given the worker choices, the broker proceeds to select a group of workers to be
included in the survey, based on two constraints:
Monetary cost constraint. A requester sets an overall cost C for a survey. The
broker selects nj workers who picked the j-th privacy setting associated with cost cj.
To stay within the overall cost bound, the broker ensures
P
j
njcj C.
Privacy constraint. For each worker, the cumulative privacy loss throughout the
system lifetime is capped at ðemax; dmaxÞ. Each worker i in survey j incurs a known
privacy cost ðeij; dijÞ. The accumulated privacy loss for worker i is therefore
ðPj eij;Pj dijÞ where the summation is over all the past surveys taken by this
worker. The residual privacy budget for the worker is consequently ðRðeÞi ;RðdÞi Þ,
where RðeÞi ¼ emax 
P
j eij and R
ðdÞ
i ¼ dmax 
P
j dij. To guarantee that the worker’s
cumulative privacy loss stays within the lifetime privacy budget, the broker must
ensure that for the new survey, ei RðeÞi and di RðdÞi .
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For a new survey, we can therefore pose the selection of a set S of workers to
survey as an optimization problem:
arg min
S	U
RMSE
s:t:
P
j
njcj C and 8i 2 S : ei RðeÞi ^ di RðdÞi ;
ð4:13Þ
where the RMS error is obtained from Eq. (4.12). For the special case when a
worker chooses a “no privacy” setting, which in theory translates to an uncon-
strained loss in privacy e ! 1ð Þ, we make the practical choice of using e ¼ 0,
d ¼ 0, reflecting that the worker is not concerned about the privacy implications in
this case.
Note that the upper bounds emax and dmax are used to capture the relative privacy
loss for each of the workers, which the broker relies on to ensure a fair distribution
of the privacy loss across workers. Workers whose privacy budget is exhausted can
be given a new identity which is unlinked to the previous one, and a new privacy
budget, allowing them participation in future surveys. Another possible option is to
increase all the workers’ privacy budgets once a significant portion of the workers
deplete their budget. Regardless of the broker’s policy, workers can always choose
to quit the system when they deem their cumulative privacy loss too high.
4.5.3.3 Balancing Cost, Accuracy, and Privacy Fairness Across
Multiple Surveys
When considering a series of surveys, additional factors may influence the broker’s
choices, beyond the cost and privacy constraints. In particular, Quality of Service
(QoS) across surveys aims to keep an (ideally) constant RMS error over successive
surveys that can be maintained and guaranteed to the requesters, while fairness aims
to balance the residual level of privacy across workers, since privacy can be seen as
a non-renewable resource, which should be equally depleted across workers. QoS
considerations may motivate the broker to select for a survey workers with low
error, but this may deplete such workers’ privacy budget rapidly. Consequently,
those workers may be excluded from participation in subsequent surveys, resulting
in deterioration of QoS over time.
To control the influence of QoS and fairness considerations, a “fairness
parameter” a 2 ½0; 1 is set by the broker. The monetary and privacy cost of worker
i are then combined into an overall cost Fi, given by:
Fi ¼ ð1 aÞ ciC þ a max
ei
RðeÞi
;
di
RðdÞi
" #
: ð4:14Þ
The first term considers the monetary cost of the worker for this survey, as a
fraction of the budget available for the survey. The second term considers the
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privacy depleted by this worker’s participation in the survey, as a fraction of the
worker’s residual privacy budget. When a ! 0, monetary cost is of primary
concern and fairness in privacy depletion is ignored. Conversely, when a ! 1,
monetary cost is ignored and workers with a low residual privacy budget are
assigned high cost, disfavoring them for selection so as to maintain fairness in
privacy depletion. The next section presents the selection algorithm that uses this
combined cost metric.
4.5.3.4 Algorithm for Worker Selection
For a new survey, Algorithm 4.1 is executed to select the set of workers who yield
the best accuracy within the given cost constraint, while also maintaining fairness in
privacy depletion among workers. The initial construction of this set assumes that
(a) all selected workers will actually take the survey, and (b) Loki can correctly
predict the privacy level choice of each worker according to their past history. In
reality, these assumptions may not hold, but the algorithm can be easily modified to
refine the set based on actual worker feedback.
Evaluating all possible subsets S	U of workers to determine the optimum would
be intractable. Instead, Loki uses a greedy heuristic approach, by which the broker
constructs the set S incrementally, each time adding the worker who would be most
cost effective, while taking into account the QoS and fairness considerations. Given
a set of workers S	U, Eq. (4.12) evaluates the expected error RMSEðSÞ of the set,
based on past performance. Adding the worker i to the set would result in the set
S[fig, for which the expected error RMSEðS[figÞ can be evaluated as well. The
difference DRMSEðS; iÞ ¼ RMSEðSÞ  RMSEðS[figÞ encapsulates the reduction in
error by inclusion of the worker i in the set. We can then compute bi, the
improvement in RMS error per unit of cost, for the worker i:
biðSÞ ¼
DRMSEðS; iÞ
Fi
; ð4:15Þ
where the worker cost Fi is given by Eq. (4.14) and includes both monetary and
privacy costs. The broker bootstraps the algorithm by choosing the worker with the
highest accuracy gain per unit of cost. Then in the greedy selection process, the
broker picks the worker with the highest bi at each step. By starting with an empty
set of workers, and iteratively adding workers one by one, the broker can construct
the target set S, until the monetary cost limit C is reached. Note that workers who
have depleted their lifetime privacy budget are not eligible for selection. Algorithm
5.3.4 has complexity OðKN2Þ, where K is the number of items that constitute prior
history and N is the number of workers.
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Algorithm 4.1 Greedy Worker Selection Mechanism
1: Input:U : a set of workers, each with cost cu; C: overall cost bound.
2: Output: S ⊆U : a set of survey participants.
3: S ← .0/
4: P ← {i ∈U : ci ≤C∧ εi ≤ R(ε)i ∧δi ≤ R(δ )i }. candidate workers within budget
5: while P= /0 do
6: u ← arg max
i∈P
βi(S).
7: S ← S∪{u}.
8: P ← P\{u}.
9: C ←C− cu. remaining budget
10: P ← {i ∈ P : ci ≤C}.
11: end while
12: return S.
4.5.4 Evaluation
To study the trade-offs between cost, utility, and fairness, and the long-term system
performance, the algorithm was evaluated using the Netflix dataset,18 a large dataset
of movie ratings, as a survey answer set [27]. The dataset contains over 100 million
movie ratings (on a 5-point scale) from 480; 000 anonymized Netflix customers
over 17; 000 movie titles, collected between October 1998 and December 2005.
The movies released in 2004 (1,436 in number) were used as historical information,
and the objective was to estimate the population-wide average rating of movies
released in 2005 within a specified cost budget C.
The experiments assumed a simple model of privacy choice, in which each
worker was permanently assigned into one of four privacy bins {none, low, med-
ium, high} at random, with probabilities 13.8, 24.4, 38.9, and 22.9 % respectively.
The probabilities were derived from the experimental study with real users,
described in Sect. 4.5.4.1. While this experimental setup is different from the one
discussed in Sect. 4.5.4.1, this allows us to evaluate performance on the basis of a
privacy preference breakdown observed in real-world settings. In general, different
settings can induce different preference distributions. The bins were associated with
zero-mean Gaussian noise with standard deviations c ¼ 0; 3; 6; 12 respectively
(corresponding to e ¼ 0, e ¼ 3:42, e ¼ 0:85, and e ¼ 0:21), and respective pay-
ments of $0.8, $0.4, $0.2, and $0.1 for each worker. Noise sampled from Nð0; c2Þ
was added to each of the workers’ movie ratings.
Within these settings, Loki’s selection mechanism was evaluated for different
values of the fairness control parameter a. Figure 4.2(a) shows the estimation error
EðRMSEÞ for varying values of the available budget C and for various selection
18http://www.netflixprize.com/.
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policies. For different a values, both the true error (i.e., difference between the
estimate and the ground truth available in the dataset), depicted with solid lines, as
well as the corresponding estimated error (computed using Eq. 4.12), depicted with
dashed lines, are shown in Fig. 4.2(a). The estimated error closely reflects the true
error, and is hence of sufficient accuracy to be useful in the selection decision. The
figure shows also two baseline selection strategies: random selection, in which a
random set of workers is selected subject to the cost constraint, and a “best pre-
dictors” selection, in which the subset of the population that has the highest his-
torical accuracy (i.e., is most representative of the population) is selected subject to
the cost constraint. As can be expected, random selection of workers resulted in the
lowest accuracy (users who are “bad predictors” or who provide very noisy answers
to protect their privacy are just as likely to be chosen as more “valuable” users), and
the selection of “best predictors” consistently yielded near-perfect estimates, even
by surveying as low as 37 % of the population. Setting a ¼ 0 yields accuracy
identical to the “best predictors” selection algorithm, but as a progressively
increases, the error increases.
The loss in accuracy is compensated for in privacy fairness. To evaluate the
performance in a series of surveys, the selection algorithm was applied, sequen-
tially, to a set of 500 movies released in 2005, again using the movies from 2004 as
prior history. Figure 4.2 shows the privacy depletion, for various a settings. When a
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4.2 Impact of the
selection policy on
(a) accuracy versus cost in a
single survey, and (b) the
estimation error over multiple
surveys
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is low, the error is initially low, but rises rapidly with successive movies. This
happens because the best performing workers are selected for the initial movies
(yielding low error), but deplete their privacy rapidly. Conversely, a choice of high
a results in fairer depletion of privacy, prolonging the lifetime of workers in the
system and giving more consistent quality of estimates over time. In the long run,
the broker therefore has an incentive to choose a larger a setting to ensure fairness
and consistency in the quality of the results. Note that the algorithm allows this
parameter to be chosen by the surveyor on a per-survey basis.
4.5.4.1 Prototype Implementation
Loki was also implemented as a prototype to evaluate the system with real users, in
an experiment involving 131 volunteers [27].
The prototype19 consists of a front-end application for workers to participate in
surveys (screenshots of the iPhone app are shown in Fig. 4.3), and a back-end
database/server that stores worker data and communicates with the app. Gaussian
noise is generated locally by the app using the Box-Muller method, and obfuscated
responses are uploaded to the server. The no, low, medium, and high privacy
settings correspond to c ¼ 0; 3; 6; and 12 and e ¼ 0; 3:42; 0:85 and 0:21 respec-
tively. The server was built using the Django (Python) Web Framework and uses a
MySQL database to store worker details and surveys.
The system was trialed with 131 volunteers, all 3rd and 4th year undergraduate
students studying Electrical Engineering at UNSW. Of the 131 students who took a
lecturer assessment survey, 18 (13.7 %) chose no privacy, 32 (24.4 %) chose low
privacy, 51 (38.9 %) chose medium privacy, and 30 (22.9 %) chose high privacy.
Medium was chosen by most since users perceived it as a “safer” option than any of
the extreme values.
The accuracy of the responses was validated by comparing them to the
university-run rating mechanism, and by comparing the ratings across the privacy
bins in the system. In general, the standard deviation of the mean lecturer rating
falls with the square root of the number of samples constituting the mean. The
evaluation showed that even with a relatively small sample size of 131 participants,
the error in estimates was still reasonably small.
4.6 Challenges and Opportunities
Crowdsourcing is an emerging and promising model for information gathering and
problem solving that is already transforming industry and scientific practices,
allowing researchers access to human resources in a scope that was not possible
19Available at https://itunes.apple.com/au/app/loki/id767077965?mt=8.
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before. Unfortunately, while the opportunities of crowdsourcing are still being
explored, little attention has been given to the privacy implications that crowd-
sourcing platforms may impose for their workers. The topic of privacy in online
systems has earned much research attention in recent years, but the study of privacy
in the context of crowdsourcing systems is still in its infancy. We outline below
some of the challenges that are yet to be addressed in this area.
Understanding privacy risks in crowdsourcing platforms. The research
community has come a long way in the last few years in understanding the
implications of the “Big Data” revolution on users’ privacy in online services, and
the power of data mining tools to uncover information in ways that may break
users’ expectations of privacy. Crowdsourcing platforms, which provide the ability
to solicit information from a large community of workers, are not devoid of these
risks, yet only little work has been conducted to understand how such risks apply to
crowdsourcing. Exploration of existing crowdsourcing platforms and the privacy
risks involved in using them would be vital for educating both workers and
requesters on these risks and for designing proper privacy-enhancing mechanisms
in crowdsourcing platforms.
Understanding the role of anonymity in crowdsourcing platforms. Among
the privacy risks involved in the use of crowdsourcing platforms, anonymity plays a
unique role. On one hand, some instances of crowdsourcing, like academic studies
that are vetted by Institutional Review Boards, include an integral requirement to
minimize the privacy risks that the human subjects are exposed to, including
safeguarding their anonymity. On the other hand, establishing a link between virtual
Fig. 4.3 Screenshots of iPhone app showing (a) list of surveys and privacy levels available to the
workers, (b) the questions and ratings entered by the worker, and (c) the worker responses
uploaded after noise addition
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worker accounts and real people could play a vital role in establishing the reliability
of the gathered information and in mitigating worker fraud. Finding the right bal-
ance between these conflicting goals is one of the challenges that existing crowd-
sourcing platforms will need to face as this area keeps evolving. This conflict also
presents an opportunity for specialized crowdsourcing services that emphasize one
aspect over another, depending on the specific subject area, for example, crowd-
sourcing services that impose harsh restrictions to guarantee worker anonymity in
(highly sensitive) human studies, versus services that forgo worker privacy to
provide better matching between requesters and skilled workers.
Designing privacy-preserving crowdsourcing mechanisms. Participation in
surveys and disclosure of information in crowdsourcing platforms exposes workers
to risks of privacy loss, and these risks increase as workers participate in an
increasing number of surveys and give away more information over time. While
any particular piece of information may seem insignificant, the aggregated data,
linked to the same worker, may be collected over time and may reveal significant
amounts of information about the worker. While regulations and legally-binding
terms of use may be sufficient to prevent privacy-invading data misuse by honest
parties, they may not be effective in preventing privacy loss in the face of data theft
or human error. Therefore, proposing and evaluating mechanisms for enhancing
privacy in crowdsourcing applications is vital for protecting worker privacy in such
platforms, or at least for educating workers and giving them more control over the
rate of privacy loss. Such research could draw from existing works on
privacy-preserving computations, and adapt them to the distributed nature of
crowdsourcing applications.
Worker compensation for privacy loss. Existing crowdsourcing platforms tend
to ignore the impact of privacy concerns on worker participation, and set a fixed
price per task. This policy may consequently drive away workers who value their
privacy above the suggested compensation, and introduce a bias towards workers
who place a lower value on their privacy. Compensating workers for their privacy
loss may somewhat mitigate this problem, but it introduces many other challenges:
the workers’ privacy choices may become a source of privacy leak even before
participation in the survey; workers may not be truthful about their privacy costs and
may provide false answers in surveys, to protect their privacy while maximizing
compensation; and participation in multiple surveys over time may call for different
mechanisms than those studied so far in single-query settings. While several works
have started investigating such problems, many of these questions are still open.
4.7 Conclusion
We provided in this chapter an overview of the state-of-the-art of privacy in
crowdsourcing platforms, including existing frameworks that can be leveraged to
enhance user privacy in these platforms, and the challenges that are yet to be
addressed. The research community has made great strides in recent years
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developing new semantic definitions of privacy, given various realistic character-
izations of adversarial knowledge and reasoning. However, while research and
technology play a critical role in privacy protection for personal data, they do not
solve the problem in its entirety. In the future, technological advances must dovetail
with public policy, government regulations, and developing social norms. Many
challenges still remain, and we believe that this will be an active and important
research area for many years to come.
References
1. A face is exposed for AOL searcher No. 4417749. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/
technology/09aol.html
2. Agrawal D, Aggarwal CC (2001) On the design and quantification of privacy preserving data
mining algorithms. In: PODS
3. Agrawal R, Srikant R (2000) Privacy-preserving data mining. In: SIGMOD
4. Arrington M (2006) AOL proudly releases massive amounts of private data. In: TechCrunch
5. Bennett J, Lanning S (2007) The Netflix prize. In: KDD Cup and workshop
6. Bogdanov D (2013) Sharemind: programmable secure computations with practical
applications. PhD thesis, University of Tartu
7. Chen R, Akkus I, Francis P (2013) SplitX: high-performance private analytics. In: ACM
SIGCOMM
8. Chen R, Reznichenko A, Francis P, Gehrke J (2012) Towards statistical queries over
distributed private user data. In: NSDI
9. Chen Y, Chong S, Kash IA, Moran T, Vadhan SP (2013) Truthful mechanisms for agents that
value privacy. In: EC, pp 215–232
10. Coull SE, Right CV, Monrose F, Collins MP, Reiter MK (2007) Playing Devil’s advocate:
inferring sensitive information from anonymized network traces. In: NDSS
11. Dandekar P, Fawaz N, Ioannidis S (2012) Privacy auctions for recommender systems. In:
WINE
12. Dwork C, Kenthapadi K, Mcsherry F, Mironov I, Naor M (2006) Our data, ourselves: privacy
via distributed noise generation. In: EUROCRYPT
13. Dwork C, McSherry F, Nissim K, Smith A (2006) Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private
data analysis. In: TCC, pp 265–284
14. Eagle N (2009) txteagle: Mobile crowdsourcing. In: Internationalization, design and global
development. Springer
15. Evfimievski AV, Gehrke J, Srikant R (2003) Limiting privacy breaches in privacy preserving
data mining. In: PODS
16. Evfimievski AV, Srikant R, Agarwal R, Gehrke J (2002) Privacy preserving data mining of
association rules. Knowl Discov Data Mining
17. Friedman A, Sharfman I, Keren D, Schuster A (2014) Privacy-preserving distributed stream
monitoring. In NDSS, San Diego, USA
18. Ghosh A, Roth A (2011) Selling privacy at auction. In: 12th ACM Conference on electronic
commerce
19. Goldreich O, Micali S, Wigderson A (1987) How to play any mental game. In: 19th
Annual ACM symposium on theory of computing, STOC ‘87, pp 218–229. ACM
20. Golle P (2006) Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US population. In:
ACM Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
21. Hafner K (2006) Researchers yearn to use AOL logs, but they hesitate. The New York Times
22. Hill K (2012) How target figured out a teen girl was pregnant before her father did. Forbes
82 T. Kandappu et al.
23. Howe J (2008) Crowdsourcing: why the power of the crowd is driving the future of business,
1st edn. Crown Publishing Group, New York
24. TZ Jr. AOL technology chief quits after data release. The New York Times
25. Kandappu T, Sivaraman V, Friedman A, Boreli R (2013) Controlling privacy loss in
crowdsourced platforms. Technical Report, NICTA
26. Kandappu T, Sivaraman V, Friedman A, Boreli R (2013) Exposing and mitigating privacy loss
in crowdsourced survey platforms. In: ACM CoNEXT student workshop
27. Kandappu T, Sivaraman V, Friedman A, Boreli R (2014) Loki: a privacy-conscious platform
for crowdsourced surveys. In: COMSNETS
28. Kargl F, Friedman A, Boreli R (2013) Differential privacy in intelligent transportation
systems. In: WiSec, pp 107–112, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM
29. Kargupta H, Datta S, Wang Q, Sivakumar K (2003) On the privacy preserving properties of
random data perturbation techniques. In: International conference on data mining
30. Kosinski M, Stillwell D, Graepel T (2013) Private traits and attributes are predictable from
digital records of human behavior. In: National Academy of Sciences
31. Laudon KC (1993) Markets and privacy. In: ICIS, pp 65–75
32. Lease M, Hullman J, Bigham JP, Bernstein MS, Kim J, Lasecki W, Bakhshi S, Mitra T,
Miller RC (2013) Mechanical turk is not anonymous. SSRN
33. Li N, Li T, Venkatasubramanian S (2007) t-closeness: privacy beyond k-anonymity and
l-diversity. In: International conference on data engineering
34. Liew CK, Choi UJ, Liew CJ (1985) A data distortion by probability distribution. In: ACM
TODS
35. Ligett K, Roth A (2012) Take it or leave it: running a survey when privacy comes at a cost. In:
8th International workshop of internet and network economics
36. Lomas N (2013) Handshake is a personal data marketplace where users get paid to sell their
own data. Techcrunch, 2 September 2013. Accessed 27 March 2014
37. Machanavajjhala A, Gehrke J, Kifer D, Venkatasubramaniam M (2006) l-Diversity: privacy
beyond k-anonymity. In: International conference on data engineering
38. McSherry F, Mahajan R (2010) Differentially-private network trace analysis. SIGCOMM
Comput Commun Rev 40(4):123–134
39. Narayanan M, Shmatikov V (2008) Robust De-anonymization of large sparse datasets. In:
IEEE symposium on security and privacy
40. Oremus W (2012) What happens when our cellphones can predict our every move? Slate
41. Rastogi V, Nath S (2010) Differentially private aggregation of distributed time-series with
transformation and encryption. In: SIGMOD
42. Reed J, Aviv AJ, Wagner D, Haeberlen A, Pierce BC, Smith JM (2010) Differential privacy
for collaborative security. In: EUROSEC, ACM, pp 1–7
43. S. report for chairman Rockefeller. A review of the data broker industry: Collection, use, and
sale of consumer data for marketing purposes. Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, United States Senate, 18 December 2013. Accessed 27 March 2014
44. Ribeiro BF, Chen W, Miklau G, Towsley DF (2008) Analyzing privacy in enterprise packet
trace anonymization. In: Network and distributed system security symposium
45. Riederer C, Erramilli V, Chaintreau A, Krishnamurthy B, Rodriguez P (2011) For sale: your
data, by: you. In: ACM Workshop on Hotnets
46. Samarati P, Sweeney L (1998) Generalizing data to provide anonymity when disclosing
information (abstract). In: PODS, p 188
47. Schenk E, Guittard C (2011) Towards a characterization of crowdsourcing practices. J Innov
Econ (1):93–107
48. Shi E, Chan THH, Riefel EG, Chow R, Song D (2011) Privacy-preserving aggregation of time
series data. In: Network and distributed system security symposium
49. Simonite T (2014) Sell your personal data for 8$ a month. MIT Technol Rev. Accessed 27
March 2014
50. Simonite T (2013) If facebook can profit from your data, why can’t you? MIT Technol Rev.
Accessed 27 March 2014
4 Privacy in Crowdsourced Platforms 83
51. Sweeney L (2000) Simple demographics often identify people uniquely, laboratory for
internation data privacy. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh
52. Sweeney L (2002) k-Anonynity: a model for protecting privacy. Int J Uncertain Fuzziness
Knowl-Based Syst 2002
53. Varshney LR (2012) Privacy and reliability in crowdsourcing service delivery. In: SRII global
conference, pp 55–60
54. Wallace N, Whyte S (2013) Supermarket spies: big retail has you in its sights. In: The Sydney
Morning Herald
55. Warner SL (1965) Randomized response: a survey technique for eliminating evasive answer
bias. J Am Stat Assoc
56. Yan T, Marzilli M, Holmes R, Ganesan D, Corner M (2009) mCrowd: a platform for mobile
crowdsourcing. In: ACM SenSys
84 T. Kandappu et al.
